Royal Army College

Lesson Overview

Lessons 01 and 02 established what capability is and what it is made of. This lesson takes the first practical step of capability development: deciding what capability the force needs. Before a force can build, it must choose what to build, and that choice governs everything after it. Build the wrong capabilities, however well, and the means are wasted, just as the estimate's first step of fixing the real aim governs all that follows. For a small state the stakes are sharper still: it cannot build everything, so a poor choice scatters means it cannot spare.

The central principle is simple. Capability goals must be grounded in the tasks the force must actually perform, not in what is impressive, fashionable, or what other forces possess. You decide what you need by working from what you must be able to do: identify the tasks the nation needs the force to perform, then derive the capabilities those tasks require. For a small humanitarian home-defence force, that means grounding goals in its relief and home-defence work and building what those tasks demand.

By the end you will be able to explain why deciding what capability the force needs is the foundational first step of capability development; explain why capability goals must be grounded in the force's actual tasks; derive capability goals from the force's roles and tasks; recognise the dangers of ungrounded goals, the impressive, the fashionable, and the imitative; and set sound, prioritised goals for a small force within its limited means.

Key Terms

Capability goals: the decisions about what the force must be able to do; the first practical step of capability development, guiding all the building that follows.
Grounding in tasks: the principle that goals must be derived from the tasks the force must actually perform, not from what is impressive, fashionable, or imitative.
The force's roles and tasks: what the nation needs its force to do, the relief, home-defence, and other work, from which its required capabilities are derived.
Deriving capability from tasks: working from the tasks the force must perform to the capabilities needed to perform them.
Ungrounded goals: goals not traceable to a real task, pursued because they are impressive, fashionable, or imitative, and so wasteful of means.
Prioritisation: deciding, within limited means, which genuine needs to build first and most.

Why deciding what to build comes first

Deciding what capability the force needs is the foundational first step, and an officer must grasp why it governs all that follows. The reason is the estimate's reason for fixing the real aim first: everything after serves the decision, so a wrong decision sends all the later work, the analysis, the building, the sustaining, toward the wrong end. A force that builds the wrong capabilities superbly has still wasted its means. The quality of the building cannot redeem a wrong choice of what to build, any more than a flawless plan can redeem a wrong aim.

For a small state this is not merely first but hard. A wealthy power can build broadly and need not choose sharply. A small state cannot. Its limited means cannot meet every want, so the choice of what to build, and what to leave unbuilt, is a sharp one that largely decides whether the means go to what the force most needs or are scattered. An officer of such a force must treat this choice with great seriousness and make it by the task-grounded method that follows.

Grounding capability goals in tasks

A capability goal is sound when it is derived from a task the force must perform, and unsound when it is not, however impressive the capability. This is the discipline an officer must hold firmly.

The method works in one direction, from tasks to capabilities. The nation needs the force to perform certain tasks; the capabilities the force needs are those required to perform them. So begin from the tasks: ask what the nation needs the force to do, then ask what capabilities that demands. Every goal must trace to a task the force must perform. A capability that cannot be traced to any such task is one the force does not need and should not build.

The error is to reverse this, starting from a capability one wants, perhaps because it is impressive or fashionable, then hunting for a task to justify it. That inverts the method and dresses an ungrounded goal in after-the-fact reasoning. Identify what the force must do first; derive the capabilities second.

For a small humanitarian home-defence force, this means grounding goals in the tasks the Army actually performs: the relief work of floods, fires, searches, and storms; the home-defence task of protecting the Principality and its people; and whatever else the nation needs of it. From those tasks the Army derives what it needs, the ability to respond, to search, to defend, and builds that. Applied rigorously, this keeps a small force's limited means on the capabilities it genuinely needs.

   GROUNDING CAPABILITY GOALS IN TASKS

   SOUND (tasks -> capabilities):
   what the nation needs the force to DO (roles/tasks)
        |  derive
        v
   the CAPABILITIES those tasks require
        |
        v
   each goal TRACEABLE to a real task

   UNSOUND (reversed):
   a capability one WANTS (impressive/fashionable/imitative)
        |  then hunt for a task to justify it
        v
   ungrounded goal in after-the-fact dress

   For the RKA: ground goals in ACTUAL tasks (floods, fires,
   searches, storms, home-defence) and build what they require.
   A capability that traces to no real task is not needed.

The dangers of ungrounded goals

Ungrounded goals come in three forms, and an officer must recognise each.

The impressive capability is pursued because it looks formidable: fine equipment, an advanced system, something that commands respect, whether or not the force needs it. Impressiveness is seductive, but it is not grounding. Ask not whether a capability impresses but whether a task requires it.

The fashionable capability is pursued because it is current in military thinking, the thing being talked about, again regardless of need. Fashion is not grounding either.

The imitative capability is pursued because other forces have it, because it is what armies are "supposed" to have. This danger bites hardest for a small force, tempted to copy larger ones and own what proper armies own. But a small humanitarian home-defence force's tasks demand different capabilities. Imitating a large force spends limited means on capabilities suited to someone else's work.

All three share one failure: they chase capability for reasons other than the force's tasks, and so build what the force does not need. The guard against all three is the grounding principle. Of every proposed goal, ask whether it traces to a task the force must perform. If it does not, refuse it, because the means, and a small state's means above all, must go to genuine need.

Prioritising within limited means

Even after the ungrounded goals are refused, a small state usually cannot build all its genuine needs at once. So it must prioritise. This is a harder choice than refusal, because it sets real needs against one another, all grounded in real tasks, when the means cannot meet them all.

An officer prioritises by judgement, weighing several things: which tasks are most important or most likely, so their capabilities come first; which capabilities are most foundational, needed for many tasks or as the basis for others; which gaps are most urgent; and where the means buy the most real capability. The discipline is to allocate deliberately, to the most important, urgent, and foundational needs, rather than spreading the means thinly across everything (which, as the concentration principle taught, produces weakness everywhere) or allocating by inertia.

For the Army, that means building first the capabilities for its most central and likely tasks, the relief work that is its core role, and the foundational capabilities on which others depend.

This completes the deciding of what to build: ground every goal in a real task, refuse the impressive, fashionable, and imitative, and prioritise among genuine needs within the means. Do this well and the limited means go to what the force most needs, which is the foundation the rest of the course builds on. Lesson 04 takes up shortfall analysis, measuring the gap between what the force has and what it has decided it needs.

In Practice: Deciding What a Small Force Should Build

An officer of the Royal Kaharagian Army sits down to decide what their small force should build with its limited means.

They begin from the force's tasks, not from any capability they fancy. What does the nation need the Army to do? The relief work that is its central business, the floods, fires, searches, and storms; the home-defence task of protecting the Principality and its people; and its other roles. From each task they derive the capabilities it requires, so every goal traces back to real work.

Then they refuse the ungrounded. A capability that merely impresses, but answers no task, is set aside. So is one that is merely fashionable. And when the pull comes to imitate larger forces, to own what proper armies are "supposed" to own, they resist it: their force's tasks are not those forces' tasks, and copying them would burn limited means on the wrong capabilities.

Finally they prioritise, because the means cannot build every genuine need at once. They put first the capabilities for the most central and likely tasks, the core relief role; then the foundational capabilities others depend on; then the most urgent gaps; always seeking the most real capability per pound spent. The result is a sound decision: goals grounded in real tasks, the ungrounded refused, the genuine needs ranked within the means. That is the disciplined goal-setting a small state's capability development requires, and the foundation on which analysing, building, and sustaining all rest.

Check Your Understanding

Explain why deciding what capability the force needs is the foundational first step of capability development, and why a force that decides wrongly wastes its means however well it builds. Why is this choice particularly sharp for a small state?
Explain why capability goals must be grounded in the tasks the force must actually perform, and why the sound direction runs from tasks to capabilities rather than the reverse. Why is a goal sound when traceable to a real task and unsound when not, however impressive the capability?
Describe the three dangers of ungrounded goals, the impressive, the fashionable, and the imitative, and what they share. Why does the imitative danger bite hardest for a small force, and what is the guard against all three? Then explain why prioritisation is necessary for a small state, and how an officer prioritises within limited means.

Reflection (write a short paragraph): This lesson warns against three seductive but ungrounded reasons for pursuing a capability: because it impresses, because it is fashionable, and because others have it. The same temptations appear in your own choices about what to acquire or develop, in any part of life. Be honest: do you ever pursue something because it is impressive, fashionable, or common among others, rather than because you genuinely need it for something you must do? These pulls are strong and they arrive dressed in justifications, and they matter most for someone with little to spare. Describe one way you could begin practising task-grounded, prioritised decisions now, so that one day, deciding what a small force should build, you would ground its goals in real tasks and rank genuine needs rather than chase the impressive, fashionable, or imitative.

Summary

Deciding what capability the force needs comes first because everything after serves the decision; a wrong choice sends all the later work toward the wrong end, just as a flawless plan cannot redeem a wrong aim. The stakes are sharpest for a small state, whose limited means cannot meet every competing need.
Goals must be grounded in the force's actual tasks. Work from what the force must do to the capabilities it requires; a goal that traces to a real task is sound, one that does not is unsound however impressive. The error is to reverse the direction, wanting a capability and inventing a task for it. For the RKA, ground goals in relief, home-defence, and its other roles.
The dangers of ungrounded goals are the impressive (it looks formidable), the fashionable (it is current), and the imitative (others have it). All three chase capability for reasons other than the force's tasks. The imitative danger is keenest for a small force tempted to copy larger ones. The guard is to refuse any goal not traceable to a real task.
Even after refusing the ungrounded, a small state cannot build every genuine need at once and must prioritise, ranking by which tasks are most important and likely, which capabilities are most foundational, which gaps are most urgent, and where the means buy most. Allocate deliberately, not thinly or by inertia. For the Army, the core relief role and foundational capabilities come first.
This task-grounded, prioritised goal-setting is the foundation of sound capability development. It applies the estimate's fix-the-real-aim discipline and the concentration principle, deepens the focus and balance teaching of Lessons 01 and 02, and leads into shortfall analysis (Lesson 04).

Setting Goals: Deciding What Capability the Force Needs